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Abstract
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is one of the landmark results
in social choice theory. Over the years since the theorem was
proved in 1950, quite a few alternative proofs have been put
forward. In this paper, we propose yet another alternative
proof of the theorem. The basic idea is to use induction to
reduce the theorem to the base case with 3 alternatives and 2
agents and then use computers to verify the base case. This
turns out to be an effective approach for proving other im-
possibility theorems such as Sen’s and Muller-Satterthwaite’s
theorems as well. Furthermore, we believe this new proof
opens an exciting prospect of using computers to discover
similar impossibility or even possibility results.
Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest and work in apply-
ing economics models such as those from game theory to AI
as well as AI techniques to solving problems in economics.
In this paper, we consider a different application of AI to
economics: using computers to help prove and discover the-
orems in social choice theory.
The particular theorems that we are interested in in this
paper are the impossibility theorems such as those by Arrow
(1950), Sen (1970), and Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) in
social choice theory (Arrow, Sen, & Suzumura 2002), an
area concerning about how individual preferences can be ag-
gregated to form a collective preference in a society. Social
choice theory has sometimes been called “a science of the
impossible” because of the many famous impossibility the-
orems that have been proved in it. Among them, Arrow’s
theorem (Arrow 1950) on the non-existence of rational so-
cial welfare function is no doubt the most famous one. It
shows the non-existence of the collective social preference
(called social welfare function) even when some minimal
standards such as Pareto efﬁciency and non-dictatorship are
imposed. Arrow’s original proof of this result is relatively
complex, and over the years, quite a few alternative proofs
have been advanced (see e.g (Fishburn 1970; Barbera 1980;
Geanakoplos 2005)).
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In this paper, we propose yet another alternative proof of
this result, with the help of computers. Brieﬂy, Arrow’s the-
orem says that in a society with at least three possible out-
comes (alternatives) for each agent, it is impossible to have a
social welfare function that satisﬁes the following three con-
ditions: unanimity (Pareto efﬁciency), independent of irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA), and non-dictatorship. We shall show
by induction that this result holds if and only if it holds for
the base case when there are exactly two agents and three
alternatives (the single agent case is trivial). For the base
case, we verify it using computers in two ways. One views
the problem as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), and
uses a depth-ﬁrst search algorithm to generate all social wel-
fare functions that satisfy the ﬁrst two conditions, and then
veriﬁes that all of them are dictatorial. The other translates
these conditions to a logical theory and uses a SAT solver to
verify that the resulting logical theory is not satisﬁable. Ei-
ther way, it took less than one second on an AMD Opteron-
based server (with 4 1.8GHz CPUs and 8GB RAM) for the
base case to be veriﬁed.
As it turns out, this strategy works not just for proving
Arrow’s theorem. The same inductive proof can be adapted
for proving other impossibility results such as Sen’s and
Muller-Satterthwaite’s theorems. We shall outline our proof
for Muller-Satterthwaite’s theorem along this line but leave
Sen’s theorem to the full version of the paper.
These proofs suggest that many of the impossibility re-
sults in social choice theory are all rooted in some small
base cases. Thus an interesting thing to do is to use comput-
ers to explore these small base cases to try to come up with
other impossibility or possibility results, and to understand
the boundary between these two type of results. This is what
we think the long term implication of our new proofs of Ar-
row’s and other impossibility theorems will lie, and the main
reason why we want to formulate the conditions in these the-
orems in a logical language and use a SAT solver to check
their consistency. Our work in this direction is still prelimi-
nary. However, we do have two results to report, one tries to
relaxtheunanimityconditionandtheothertheIIAcondition
in Arrow’s theorem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We next re-
view Arrow’s theorem and then describe our new inductive
proof of this result. We then brieﬂy describe how this proof
can be adapted to prove Muller-Satterthwaite’s theorem. Wethen propose a logical language for social choice theory and
describe how it can be used to axiomatize Arrow’s theorem
and how the base case in our inductive proof of Arrow’s the-
orem can be checked using a SAT solver. Finally, we brieﬂy
describe our idea on using computers to discover new theo-
rems in social choice theory, and then conclude this paper.
Arrow’s Theorem
A voting model is a tuple (N;O), where N is a ﬁnite set
of individuals (agents) and O a ﬁnite set of outcomes (alter-
natives). An agent’s preference ordering is a linear order-
ing of O, and a preference proﬁle > of (N;O) is a tuple
(>1;:::;>n), where >i is agent i’s preference ordering, and
n the size of N. In the following, when N is clear from the
context, we also call > a preference proﬁle of O. Similarly,
when O is clear from the context, we also call it a preference
proﬁle of N.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a voting model (N;O), a social welfare
function is a function W : Ln ! L, where L is the set of
linear ordering of O, and n the size of N.
A social welfare function deﬁnes a social ordering for
each preference proﬁle. If we consider the social ordering
given by a social welfare function as the aggregates of the
preference orderings of the individuals in the society, it is
natural to impose some conditions on it. For instance, it
should not be dictatorial in that the aggregated societal pref-
erence ordering always is the same as a particular individ-
ual’s preference. Arrow showed that a seemingly minimal
set of such conditions turns out to be inconsistent.
In the following, given a preference proﬁle > = (>1
;:::;>n), we sometimes write >W for W(>). Thus both
a >W b and a W(>) b mean the same thing: the alternative
a is preferred over the alternative b according to the societal
preference ordering W(>).
Deﬁnition 2 A social welfare function W is unanimous
(Pareto efﬁcient) if for all alternatives a1 and a2, we have
that if a1 >i a2 for every agent i, then a1 >W a2
In words, if everyone ranks alternative a1 above a2, then a1
must be ranked above a2 socially.
Deﬁnition 3 A social welfare function W is independent of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if for all alternatives a1 and a2,
and all preference proﬁles >0 and >00, we have that 8i a1 >0
i
a2 iff a1 >00
i a2 implies that a1 >0
W a2 iff a1 >00
W a2.
Literally, IIA means that the relative social ordering of two
alternatives depends only on their relative orderings given
by each agent and has nothing to do with other alternatives.
Deﬁnition 4 An agent i is a dictator in a social welfare
function W if for all alternatives a1 and a2, a1 >W a2 iff
a1 >i a2. If there is a dictator in W, then it is said to be
dictatorial. Otherwise, W is said to be non-dictatorial.
It is easy to see that if there are at least two alternatives,
then there can be at most one dictator in any social welfare
function.
Theorem 1 (Arrow’s theorem (1950)) For any voting
model (N;O), if jOj ¸ 3, then any social welfare function
that is unanimous and IIA is also dictatorial.
Arrow’s original proof of this result is somewhat com-
plicated, and there are several alternative proofs by others,
e.g (Fishburn 1970; Barbera 1980; Geanakoplos 2005). We
now give yet another one using induction.
An Inductive Proof of Arrow’s Theorem
For ease of presentation, we assume the following notations.
² For any set S, we use S¡a to denote Snfag, i.e. the result
of deleting a in S.
² We extend the above notation to tuples as well:
if t = (t1;:::;tn), then t¡i denotes the tuple
(t1;:::;ti¡1;ti+1;:::;tn). Furthermore, we use (t¡i;s) to
denote the result of replacing ith item in t by s: (t¡i;s) =
(t1;:::;ti¡1;s;ti+1;:::;tn).
² If > is a linear ordering of O, and a 2 O, then we let >¡a
be the restriction of > on O¡a: for any a0;a00 2 O¡a,
a0 >¡a a00 iff a0 > a00. On the other hand, if > is a linear
ordering of O¡a for some a 2 O, then we let >+a to
be the extension of > to O such that for any a0 2 O¡a,
a0 >+a a (we could insert a anywhere in the order, but for
concreteness we put it in the last position). Thus if > is a
linear ordering of O, and a 2 O, then >
+a
¡a is (>¡a)+a,
i.e. the result of moving a to the bottom of the ordering.
These notations extend to tuples of orderings. Thus if >
is a preference proﬁle of (N;O¡a), then
>+a = (>1;:::;>n)+a = (>
+a
1 ;:::;>+a
n );
which will be a preference proﬁle of (N;O).
Like any inductive proof, there are two cases for our proof,
the inductive case and the base case.
The inductive case
Lemma 1 If there is a social welfare function for n indi-
viduals and m + 1 alternatives that is unanimous, IIA and
non-dictatorial, then there is a social welfare function for
n individuals and m alternatives that satisﬁes these three
conditions as well, for all n ¸ 2;m ¸ 3.
Proof: Let N = f1;:::;ng be a set of n agents, O a set
of m + 1 alternatives, and W a social welfare function for
(N;O) that satisﬁes the three conditions in the lemma. We
show that there is an a 2 O such that the “restriction” of W
on O¡a also satisﬁes these three conditions.
For any a 2 O, we deﬁne the restriction of W on O¡a,
written Wa, to be the following function: for any preference
proﬁle > = (>1;:::;>n) of O¡a, Wa(>) = W(>+a)¡a.
In other words, Wa(>) is the result of applying W to the
preference proﬁle >+a of O, and then projecting it on O¡a.
The key property of this welfare function is that for any
a0 and a00 in O¡a, and any preference proﬁle > of O¡a,
a0 Wa(>) a00 iff a0 W(>+a) a00.
We show that Wa is unanimous and IIA:
² Suppose a0;a00 2 O¡a and a0 >i a00 for all i. By our deﬁ-
nition a0 >
+a
i a00 for all i as well. Since W is unanimous,
a0 W(>+a) a00. Thus a0 Wa(>) a00. This shows that Wa
is unanimous.² Let a0;a00 2 O¡a and >0;>00 be two preference proﬁles
of O¡a such that 8i a0 >0
i a00 iff a0 >00
i a00. Thus
8i a0 >
0+a
i a00 iff a0 >
00+a
i a00 as well. Since W is IIA,
a0 W(>0+a) a00 iff a0 W(>00+a) a00. Hence a0 Wa(>0) a00
iff a0 Wa(>00) a00. This shows that Wa is also IIA.
We now show that there is an a 2 O such that Wa is not
dictatorial. First for any a 2 O and any a0;a00 2 O¡a, and
any proﬁle > of O, we have
a0 >W a00 iff a0 W(>
+a
¡a) a00: (1)
This follows because W is IIA and a0;a00 2 O¡a.
Now let b be any alternative in O. Suppose Wb has a
dictator, say agent 1 in it. Since W is not dictatorial, there
must be a preference proﬁle > of O and some c;d 2 O such
that c >1 d but d >W c. Since jOj = m + 1 > 3, we can
ﬁnd an alternative e 2 O¡b n fc;dg. We now show that We
is not dictatorial. Suppose otherwise. There are two cases:
² Agent 1 is again the dictator in We. Then We(>¡e) and
>1 agree on c and d. Thus c We(>¡e) d. By our def-
inition of We, this means that c [W(>
+e
¡e)]¡e d. Since
c;d 2 O¡e, this means that c W(>
+e
¡e) d. By (1), we
have c >W d, a contradiction with our assumption that
d >W c.
² Another agent, say agent 2 is the dictator in We. Let
a1 6= a2 be any two alternatives in O n fb;eg. This is
possible since jOj > 3. Let >0 be a preference proﬁle of
O such that a1 >0
1 a2 but a2 >0
2 a1. From a1 >0
1 a2,
fa1;a2g µ O¡b, and that agent 1 is the dictator in Wb,
we can conclude a1 >0
W a2 as we have done in the pre-
vious case. Similarly, from a2 >0
2 a1, fa;a2g µ O¡e,
and that agent 2 is the dictator in We, we can conclude
a2 >0
W a1, a contradiction.
Thus we have shown that We cannot have a dictator.
Note that it is essential for our proof that m ¸ 3. Notice
also that we only use the assumptions that W is IIA and non-
dictatorial in our proof that Wa is not dictatorial for some
a 2 O. The assumption that W is unanimous is used only
in showing that Wa is also unanimous.
Lemma 2 If there is a social welfare function for n+1 indi-
viduals and m alternatives that is unanimous, IIA and non-
dictatorial, there will also be a social welfare function for n
individual and m alternatives that satisﬁes these three con-
ditions as well, for all n ¸ 2;m ¸ 3.
Proof: Let N = f1;:::;n;n + 1g be a set of agents, and O
a set of m alternatives, and W a social welfare function for
(N;O) that satisﬁes the three conditions in the lemma. For
any i 6= j 2 N, we deﬁne Wi;j to be the following social
welfare function for (N¡i;O): for any preference proﬁle >
of (N;O), Wi;j(>¡i) = W(>¡i;>j), where (>¡i;>j),
as we deﬁned earlier, is the result of replacing >i in >
by >j. Thus the social welfare function Wi;j is deﬁned
through W by making agent i and agent j always agree-
ing with each other. Clearly, for any i;j, Wi;j is unanimous
and IIA because W satisﬁes these two conditions. We now
show that we can ﬁnd two distinct agents i and j such that
Wi;j is not dictatorial. Suppose otherwise, for every pair
i > j 2 N, Wi;j is dictatorial. Now consider three dis-
tinct agents i1 < i2 < i3 in N. This is possible because
jNj = n + 1 ¸ 3. Suppose i is the dictator in Wi1;i2, j
the dictator in Wi1;i3, and k the dictator in Wi2;i3. There are
two cases:
² Case 1: i = j = k. Since W is not dictatorial, there is a
proﬁle > of (N;O) and two alternatives a1 and a2 such
that >W and >i disagree on a1 and a2, say a1 >i a2
but a2 >W a1. Now at least two players from fi1;i2;i3g
must agree on a1;a2. Let these two players be j1 and
j2, and without loss of generality, suppose j1 < j2. Now
consider the proﬁle (>¡j1;>j2). Since W is IIA, and that
>j1 and >j2 agree on a1 and a2, >W and W(>¡j1;>j2)
must agree on a1 and a2. So a2 W(>¡j1;>j2) a1. But
i is the dictator in Wj1;j2, Wj1;j2(>¡j1) must agree with
>i. Since Wj1;j2(>¡j1) is deﬁned to be W(>¡j1;>j2),
thus W(>¡j1;>j2) agrees with >i, so a1 W(>¡j1;>j2
) a2, a contradiction.
² Case 2: i 6= j or i 6= k or j 6= k. First, by our deﬁnition of
Wx;y, and our assumption that agents i, j, and k are dic-
tators in Wi1;i2, Wi1;i3, and Wi2;i3, respectively, for any
preference proﬁle > of (N;O), if >i1 = >i2 = >i3, then
>W=>i, >W=>j, and>W=>k. Sincetwooffi;j;kg
must be distinct, this means that fi;j;kg µ fi1;i2;i3g.
Since i must be in N¡i1, so i 6= i1, thus i 2 fi2;i3g.
Similarly, j 2 fi2;i3g and k 2 fi1;i3g. This leads to
eight possible combinations for i, j, and k. Each of them
will lead to a contradiction, using the following table:
(i;j;k) >i1 >i2 >i3
(i2;i2;i1) c > a > b a > b > c a > c > b
(i2;i2;i3) case 1
(i2;i3;i1) case 1
(i2;i3;i3) c > a > b b > c > a a > b > c
(i3;i2;i1) c > a > b a > b > c b > c > a
(i3;i2;i3) b > a > c b > c > a a > b > c
(i3;i3;i1) b > c > a b > a > c a > b > c
(i3;i3;i3) case 1
Each row in the above table either gives a preference pro-
ﬁle that will lead to a contradiction or point to “case 1”,
meaning a contradiction can be derived similar to case
1. For instance, consider the row (i;j;k) = (i2;i3;i1),
which says “case 1”. This case can be reduced to “case
1” as follows. Since i = i2 is the dictator in Wi1;i2, i1
is the dictator in Wi2;i1. Similarly, i1 is the dictator in
Wi3;i1 because i3 = k is the dictator in Wi1;i3. Thus i1
is the dictator in Wi2;i1, Wi3;i1, and Wi2;i3, and the same
reasoning in case 1 will lead to a contradiction here.
Now consider the ﬁrst row (i;j;k) = (i2;i2;i1), and the
preference proﬁle > given in the row:
c >i1 a >i1 b; a >i2 b >i2 c; a >i3 c >i3 b:
Because i2 = j is the dictator in Wi1;i3, W(>¡i1;>i3) =
>i2. But >i1 and >i3 agree on b and c, thus by IIA:
b >W c iff b W(>¡i1;>i3) c iff b >i2 c:
So
b >W c: (2)Similarly, >i1 and >i2 agree on a and b, and i2 is the
dictator in Wi1;i2, thus a >W b iff a >i2 b. So
a >W b: (3)
Now >i2 and >i3 agree on a and c, and i1 is the dictator
in Wi2;i3, thus a >W c iff a >i1 c. So c >W a, which
contradicts with (2) and (3). The other cases are similar.
This means that there must be some i 6= j 2 N such that
Wi;j is not dictatorial.
Again notice that it is essential for our proof that jNj =
n + 1 ¸ 3, and that the existence of a non-dictatorial Wi;j
depends only on the assumptions that W is IIA and non-
dictatorial.
By these two lemmas, we see that Arrow’s theorem holds
iff it holds for the case when there are exactly two agents
and three possible outcomes.1
The Base case
We now turn to the proof of the base case, and as we men-
tioned earlier, we use computer programs to do that.
The base case says that when jNj = 2 and jOj = 3, there
is no social welfare function on (N;O) that is unanimous,
IIA, and non-dictatorial. A straightforward way of verifying
this is to generate all possible social welfare functions in
(N;O) and check all of them one by one for these three
conditions. However, there are too many such functions for
this to be feasible on current computers: there are 3! = 6
number of linear orderings of O, resulting in 6£6 = 36 total
number of preference proﬁles of (N;O), and 636 possible
social welfare functions.
Thus one should not attempt to explicitly generate all pos-
sible social welfare functions. What we did instead is to
generate explicitly all social welfare functions that satisfy
the conditions of unanimity and IIA, and then check if any
of them is non-dictatorial.
We treat the problem of generating all social welfare func-
tions that satisfy the conditions of unanimity and IIA as
a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). A CSP is a triple
(V;D;C), where V is a set of variables, and D a set of do-
mains, one for each variable in V , and C a set of constraints
on V (see, e.g. (Russell & Norvig 2003)). An assignment of
the CSP is a function that maps each variable in V to a value
in its domain. A solution to the CSP is an assignment that
satisﬁes all constraints in C.
Now consider the voting model (f1;2g;fa;b;cg) in our
base case. We deﬁne a CSP for it by introducing 36 vari-
ables x1;:::;x36, one for each preference proﬁle of the vot-
ing model. The domain of these variables is the set of 6 lin-
ear orderings of fa;b;cg, and the constraints are the instan-
tiations of the unanimity and IIA conditions on the voting
model. As can be easily seen, there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the social welfare functions of the vot-
ing model and the assignments of the CSP. Furthermore, a
solution to the CSP corresponds to a social welfare func-
tion that satisﬁes the unanimity and IIA conditions, and vice
versa.
1Technically speaking, we also need to consider the case when
jNj = 1, but this is a trivial case.
To solve this CSP, we use a depth-ﬁrst search that back-
tracks whenever the current partial assignment violates the
constraints, and implemented it in SWI-Prolog. As we men-
tioned earlier, when run on our AMD server machine, our
Prolog program returned in less than one second two solu-
tions, one corresponds to the social welfare function where
agent 1 is the dictator, and the other agent 2 the dictator.
This veriﬁes the base case of our inductive proof of Ar-
row’s theorem, thus completes our proof. As mentioned in
the introduction, we also veriﬁed the base case using a SAT
solver. This requires a logical language to encode postulates
in social choice theory, and will be described in a separate
section below.
Some other impossibility theorems
As mentioned before, the same strategy that we used for
proving Arrow’s theorem can be used to prove other impos-
sibility theorems. In fact, we have modiﬁed the above proof
for proving Sen’s and Muller-Satterthwaite’s impossibility
theorems. We brieﬂy describe how this is done for Muller-
Satterthwaite’s theorem, and leave Sen’s theorem to the full
version of the paper.
Arrow’s theorem is about social welfare functions which
map a preference proﬁle to a preference ordering. In com-
parison, Muller-Satterthwaite’s theorem concerns about so-
called social choice functions which map a preference pro-
ﬁle to an outcome which is supposed to be the “winner” of
the voting (as represented by the preference proﬁle).
Deﬁnition 5 Given a voting model (N;O), a social choice
function is a function C : Ln ! O, where L is the set of
linear orders on O, and n the number of agents in N.
Instead of the conditions of unanimity, IIA, and non-
dictatorship in Arrow’s theorem, Muller and Satterthwaite
considered the following three corresponding conditions.
Deﬁnition 6 A social choice function C is weakly unani-
mous if for every preference proﬁle >, if there is a pair of
alternatives a1;a2 such that a1 >i a2 for every agent i, then
C(>) 6= a2.
Thus according to this condition, an alternative that is
dominated by another should never be selected.
Deﬁnition 7 A social choice function C is monotonic if, for
every preference proﬁle > such that C(>) = a, if >0 is
another proﬁle such that a >0
i a0 whenever a >i a0 for every
agent i and every alternative a0, then C(>0) = a as well.
In words, monotonicity means that if a choice function se-
lects an outcome for a preference proﬁle, then it will also
select this outcome for any other preference proﬁle that does
not decrease the ranking of this outcome.
Deﬁnition 8 An agent i is a dictator in a social choice func-
tion C if C always selects i’s top choice: for every prefer-
ence proﬁle >, C(>) = a iff for all a0 2 O that is different
from a, a >i a0. C is non-dictatorial if it has no dictator.
Theorem 2 (Muller-Satterthwaite’ Theorem (1977)) For
any voting model (N;O) such that jOj ¸ 3, any social
choice function that is weakly unanimous and monotonic is
also dictatorial.Like our proof of Arrow’s theorem, we prove this theorem
by induction. The inductive step is again by two lemmas
similar to the ones for Arrow’s theorem.
Lemma 3 If there is a social choice function for n individu-
als and m+1 alternatives that is weakly unanimous, mono-
tonic and non-dictatorial, then there is also a social choice
function for n individuals and m alternatives that satisﬁes
these three conditions, for all n ¸ 2;m ¸ 3.
Proof: Let (N;O) be a voting model such that jNj = n
and jOj = m + 1, and C a social choice function that
satisﬁes the three conditions in the lemma. Just like our
proof of the corresponding Lemma 1, for any a 2 O,
we deﬁne Ca to be a social choice function that is the
“restriction” of C on O¡a: for any preference proﬁle > of
O¡a, Ca(>) = C(>+a). Again it can be shown that for
any a 2 O, Ca is weakly unanimous and monotonic, and
there is one such a such that Ca is non-dictatorial.
Lemma 4 If there is a social choice function for n+1 indi-
viduals and m alternatives that is weakly unanimous, mono-
tonic and non-dictatorial, then there is also a social choice
function for n individuals and m alternatives that satisﬁes
these three conditions, for all n ¸ 2;m ¸ 3.
Proof: Let (N;O) be a voting model such that jNj = n+1
and jOj = m, and C a social choice function that satisﬁes
the three conditions in the lemma. Just like our proof
of Lemma 2, for any pair of agents i 6= j 2 N, we
deﬁne Ci;j to be the following social welfare function
for (N¡i;O): for any preference proﬁle > of (N;O),
Ci;j(>¡i) = C(>¡i;>j). Again it can be shown that for
any pair of agents i 6= j, Ci;j is weakly unanimous and
monotonic, and that there exists one such pair such that Ci;j
is non-dictatorial. (Actually the proof here is much simpler
than the one in the proof of Lemma 2.)
For the base case again notice that the case for N = 1
is trivial, thus we need only to consider the case when there
are two agents and three alternatives. Again the number of
all possible social choice functions is too large to enumerate
explicitly, but both our methods for verifying the base case
in Arrow’s theorem can be adapted here. For the depth-ﬁrst
search method, our program similarly reported that there are
exactly two social choice functions that are weakly unani-
mous and monotonic, and both of them are dictatorial.
Notice that our proof outlined above parallels our earlier
proof of Arrow’s theorem but does not make use of Ar-
row’s theorem. In contrast, the existing proofs of Muller-
Satterthwaite’s theorem that we know of (Muller & Satterth-
waite1977; Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green 1995) are much
more complicated and rely on Arrow’s theorem.
A Logical Language for Social Choice Theory
As we mentioned earlier, we are not just interested in alter-
native proofs of Arrow’s and other known theorems. Our
long term goal is to use computers to discover theorems in
social choice theory, game theory, and others (Lin 2007;
Lin & Tang 2007). One implication of our new proofs is
that these known impossibility results are all rooted in some
small base cases. Thus by experimenting with other condi-
tions in small cases, we could discover some new results.
Towards this end, we propose a logical language for social
choice theory.
This language is a variant of the situation calculus (Mc-
Carthy 1968; Reiter 2001), one of the best known languages
in AI. For representing Arrow’s theorem, we use two pred-
icates: p(x;a;b;s) (in the situation s, agent x prefers a
over b) and w(a;b;s) (in the situation s, a is preferred over
b according to the social welfare function). The intuition
is that in each situation, there is a preference ordering for
each player (represented by predicate p), and a social wel-
fare function for the society (predicate w). The unanimity
condition corresponds to the following axiom:
8a;b;s:[8x p(x;a;b;s)] ¾ w(a;b;s); (4)
the non-dictatorship condition the following axiom:
:9x8s;a;b:p(x;a;b;s) ´ w(a;b;s); (5)
and the IIA condition the following one:
8a;b;s1;s2:[8x:p(x;a;b;s1) ´ p(x;a;b;s2)] ¾
[w(a;b;s1) ´ w(a;b;s2)] (6)
Wealsoneedsomeaxiomstosaythatbothpandw represent
linear orderings, and that w is a function of p. Furthermore,
we need to say that each preference proﬁle is represented by
somesituation(theassumptionofunrestricteddomain). One
way to do it is to introduce an action swap(x;a;b) which
when performed will swap the positions of a and b in agent
x’s preference ordering. This way, given an initial situation
S0 that encodes any preference proﬁle, we can get any other
preference proﬁle by performing a sequence of swapping ac-
tions in S0.
However, if we are given a speciﬁc voting model, we can
name each preference proﬁle explicitly by a situation con-
stant. For instance, for the voting model (f1;2g;fa;b;cg)
corresponding to the base case in our proof of Arrow’s theo-
rem, there are 36 different proﬁles, so we introduce 36 situa-
tion constants S1;:::;S36, and add axioms like the following
ones to deﬁne them:
p(1;a;b;S1) ^ p(1;a;c;S1) ^ p(1;b;c;S1);
p(2;a;b;S1) ^ p(2;a;c;S1) ^ p(2;b;c;S1):
In fact, this is what we did for using a SAT solver to ver-
ify the base case in our inductive proof of Arrow’s theorem.
We instantiated the axioms (4) – (6) as well as the general
axioms about p and w on (f1;2g;fa;b;cg), and converted
them as well as the axioms like the above ones for the 36 sit-
uation constants to clauses. The resulting set of clauses has
35973 variables and 106354 clauses, and we were surprised
that the SAT solver Chaff2 (Moskewicz et al. 2001) returned
in less than 1 second when run on our AMD server machine
and conﬁrmed that the set of clauses has no models.
Discovering New Theorems
We have been advocating a methodology of theorem dis-
covering through exhaustive search in small domains usingcomputers (Lin 2007; Lin & Tang 2007). Along this line,
given the structure of our inductive proofs for the impossi-
bility theorems that we have here, an interesting thing to do
is to look for similar theorems by systematically exploring
a so-called ﬁnitely-veriﬁable class of conditions (Lin 2007),
meaning whether a condition in this class is a theorem can
be veriﬁed by checking if it holds in some small domains.
Our work in this direction is still preliminary. But we do
have two results to report, one tries to relax the unanimity
condition and the other the IIA condition.
Recall that the unanimity condition says that if every
agent ranks one option over another, so must the resulting
societal preference ordering. We can try to relax this, and
require that consensus work only when every one has the
same preference ordering.
Deﬁnition 9 We say that a social welfare function W is
globally unanimous if W(>;:::;>) = > for every prefer-
ence ordering > of the set of alternatives.
As it turned out, this weakening of the unanimity condi-
tion does not affect Arrow’s theorem. For the base case of
2 individuals and 3 alternatives, our depth-ﬁrst search pro-
gram shows that every social welfare function that is glob-
ally unanimous and IIA is also dictatorial. Thus the almost
same inductive proof of Arrow’s theorem above shows that
this is true in general as well.
Theorem 3 Provided that there are more than 2 alterna-
tives, every social welfare function that is globally unani-
mous and IIA is also dictatorial.
Now let’s consider a possible relaxing of the IIA con-
dition. Recall that the condition says that if two prefer-
ence proﬁles agree on the ordering between two alterna-
tives, then their corresponding societal preference orderings
should also agree on it. We could relax this, and instead of
pairs of alternatives, require this only for triples of alterna-
tives:
Deﬁnition 10 (IIA’) A social welfare function W is IIA’ if
for all alternatives a1;a2;a3 and all preference proﬁles >0
and >00, am >0
i an iff am >00
i an for each agent i and each
m and n in f1;2;3g implies that am >0
W an iff am >00
W an
for each m and n in f1;2;3g.
Using our depth-ﬁrst search algorithm we can verify that
any social welfare function on (f1;2g;fa1;a2;a3;a4g) that
is unanimous and IIA’ is also dictatorial. Thus by suitably
modifying the inductive step in our proof of Arrow’s theo-
rem, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 4 Any social welfare function that is unanimous
and IIA’ is also dictatorial, provided the number of alterna-
tives is not less than 4.
In fact, this theorem is closely related to Arrow’s theorem
through the so-called intersection principle (cf. Chapter 1
in (Arrow, Sen, & Suzumura 2002)).
Concluding Remarks
We have given a new proof of Arrow’s theorem. The ba-
sic idea is extremely simple: use induction to reduce it to
the base case which is then veriﬁed using computers. One
remarkable thing about it is that it appears to be a very gen-
eral approach for proving other theorems in the area. In fact,
we have adapted it almost straightforwardly to proving two
other well-known theorems of the same nature, one by Sen
and the other by Muller and Satterthwaite.
If all these impossibility theorems can be reduced to some
small base cases, then an interesting thing to do is to use
computers to conduct search in these small domains to try
to discover new impossibility or possibility results and to
discover the boundaries between these two type of results.
Our preliminary results described above indicate that this is
a promising line of research, and we are currently pursuing
it using our situation calculus formalization of social choice
theory given earlier in the paper.
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